The formalism used in describing the thermodynamics of abrupt (or first-order) phase transitions is reviewed as an application of maximum entropy inference. In this treatment, we show that the concepts of transition temperature, latent heat and entropy difference between phases will inevitably have an equivalent in any problem of inferring the result of a yes/no question, given information in the form of expectation values.
I. INTRODUCTION
Jaynes' proposal of the principle of maximum entropy (PME) as a general tool of probabilistic inference 1,2 is remarkable in that it is both widely used 3 and somewhat controversial 4, 5 . It asserts that the most unbiased probability distribution P given some fixed knowledge I is the one that maximizes Shannon's information entropy, S[P (x|I)] = − x P (x|I) log 2 P (x|I)
while being consistent with said knowledge. This is because S[P ] is a measure of uncertainty 6 or lack of knowledge about the degrees of freedom (represented collectively by x in the notation above) and, maximizing it leads to the probabilistic model containing the least amount of information, but nevertheless able to reproduce the features one demands of it. As this is a process of inference it cannot be deductive: predictions derived from the maximum entropy model may be proved wrong by subsequent measurements, and this reflects an incompleteness of the fixed knowledge used to constrain the maximization.
Jaynes' interpretation of the formalism of statistical mechanics sees it as just the application of this principle of maximum entropy, valid in all statistical inference, to the case of a macroscopic number of particles (and degrees of freedom). In this situation the predictions are almost perfectly sharp, with uncertainties vanishing as 1/ √ N , with N the number of degrees of freedom. This is all well described for the case of thermodynamic equilibrium of a single phase. However, how this informationtheoretical interpretation manifests itself in the case of the study of phase transitions, and what can we learn from this, is an issue which has not been so extensively clarified. For instance, in his book on probability theory 2 (p. 602), Jaynes wrote in a somewhat cryptic footnote, that "... in statistical mechanics the relative probability P j /P k of two different phases, such as liquid and solid, is the ratio of their partition functions Z j /Z k , which are the normalization constants for the sub-problems of prediction within one phase. In Bayesian analysis, the data are indifferent between two models when their normalization constants become equal; in statistical mechanics the temperature of a phase transition is the one at which the two partition functions become equal..."
This suggests that the problem of liquid-solid phase transition, or in fact, any phase transition, can be posed as a model comparison problem, and therefore the transition temperature and the free energy can be given an information-theoretical meaning. In this work, in order to remove all particularities of thermodynamics from the treatment of abrupt (or first-order) phase transitions, we present a parallel of the formalism used in first-order phase transitions based entirely on the application of the PME. We introduce a simple game, the "disc throwing" game, and answer two questions related to it by means of the PME. In the answers to these questions we will recover the concepts of transition temperature, Helmholtz free energy and the rule that imposes its equality for the two phases at the coexistence point.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section II we review the main features of the maximum entropy formalism. Section III shows an illustration of PME inference, while section IV describes and solves the disc throwing game problem. In section V we expose the perfect parallel between the solution of this problem and that of the coexistence of two phases in thermodynamical equilibrium. Finally we conclude with some remarks.
II. MAXIMUM ENTROPY INFERENCE
Consider a system (in the most general sense of the word) having N discrete degrees of freedom x and being fully described in statistical terms by a function f ( x) with known expectation value f 0 . Knowledge of f 0 is symbolically represented by I. According to the PME, the most unbiased model is the one that maximizes the Gibbs-Shannon entropy functional 
Maximization under this constraint, and the always implicit constraint of proper normalization of the probability, is achieved by the inclusion of Lagrange multipliers λ and µ respectively, after which the problem reduces to the maximization of the augmented functioñ
This leads to the well-known maximum entropy (MaxEnt) model
in which we have changed the notation from the purely abstract P ( x|I) to the mode concrete P ( x|λ), given that the parameter λ distinguishes between all the possible states of knowledge compatible with the possible values of f 0 . The function Z,
is known as the partition function. The Lagrange multiplier λ is usually determined as the unique solution of
If the degrees of freedom contained in x are continuous, Shannon entropy needs to be replaced with the relative entropy
where I 0 denotes an "initial" state of knowledge. The solution to the maximum entropy problem is now
with
In both cases (discrete and continuous degrees of freedom), the maximized entropy has a value
Now, we have just described the formalism of the canonical ensemble if we think of the system as composed by n particles with position r i and momentum p i (with i=1,...,n) and the descriptor function as the Hamiltonian f = H( r 1 , . . . , r n , p 1 , . . . , p n ). Then Eq. 5 is the canonical distribution where we identify λ = β = 1/(k B T ).
In thermodynamic notation, Eq. 11 reads,
If we introduce the Helmholtz free energy βF (β) = − ln Z(β), Eq. 12 reduces to
i.e., using β = 1/k B T ,
III. AN ILLUSTRATION OF THE MAXIMUM ENTROPY FORMALISM
Suppose we have a swimming pool full of plastic balls (all spherical) of different radii. The average volume of a ball is V . What is the average radius?
We have the constraint,
which is equivalent to
from which the most unbiased model for r is
The partition function is given by
therefore, the value of λ is determined from
i.e., λ = 4π/(9V ). Note that from inspection of Eq. 17 and the fact that λ is positive, the most probable radius is zero and the probability monotonically decreases with r. The expectation of r is then
From this example we learn two things. First, the Lagrange multiplier λ is larger for small V , and this is expected given that the smaller V is, the possible radii are more concentrated around zero and therefore there is less uncertainty about the value of the radius. This means the constraint of known V (Eq. 15) has greater "weight" for smaller V . Second, the expected radius is less than the naïve estimate r 0 = 3 r 3 , valid in the case where all the balls have the same radius. As the distribution function P (r|λ) decreases from r = 0 onward, there are more balls with r ≤ r 0 than with r > r 0 and thus the estimate r is skewed towards zero. Suppose a player can throw a disc into a surface A (with area Σ A ), containing within it a smaller surface B (with area Σ B < Σ A ). We consider A and B to be disjoint regions, as shown in Fig. 1 . A successful hit within B gives the player n B points, whereas a hit inside A (outside B) gives n A points to the player (as hitting B is more difficult, n B > n A ). This is similar to the game "rayuela" as is known in some South American countries.
We can present two questions about this game:
(a) With only the information laid out above, and particularly without knowing anything about the performance of the player, what probability should one assign to hitting B?
(b) Now consider the player has obtained an average score of n in the past (over enough trials to be considered a reliable average). What probability should one assign now to hitting B?
In (a) the intuitive answer is that the probabilities of hitting either A or B are completely determined by their areas. In fact, considering each landing point as a coordinate inside A, and because such points are mutually exclusive, exhaustive alternatives and there is symmetry under exchange, we can easily see that
From this, given that landing in A or B constitute mutually exclusive and exhaustive propositions, P (A|I 1 ) + P (B|I 1 ) = 1. Therefore,
with α = A, B. The predicted score of the player, with just the information we have in (a), is then
We see that probabilities are governed only by the ratio Σ A /Σ B , and we can conclude that always P (A|I 1 ) > P (B|I 1 ), given that the area of B is considerably smaller. Now, what happens in (b) is that we have to constrain the inference to this new information, given in the form of an expectation value. We invoke the law of large numbers and assume n = n, then the most unbiased probability for either result given n, according to the PME, is (using Eq. 9),
and
After explicitly using the result of Eq. 25 in Eq. 26 and some algebra, we have that
(27) from which it follows that λ is given by
In order to simplify notation, let us introduce
Then Eq. 28 reads,
It is clear that, when λ = 0, Eq. 31 implies
which is nothing but the result of section (a), Eq. 23. This happens when the reported average score n is the same as predicted from the area information alone. This reflects a complete lack of ability from the player to control the hitting spot, because the results do not differ from pure "random" shots. However, if n is not consistent with Eq. 23, then λ = 0 and the ratio between probabilities is not simply the ratio of the respective areas, but it is given by
i.e., defining ∆ ln P = ln P (B|I 2 ) − ln P (A|I 2 ),
or, if we define F α = n α − S α /λ, we have
Therefore, the most probable outcome (A or B) would be the one with lowest value of F .
After comparing Eqs. 34 and 31, the ratio of probabilities is given by
There will be an interesting value of n, namely the average (n A + n B )/2, where P (A|I 2 ) = P (B|I 2 ). In this case we are maximally uncertain with respect to which region the player will hit, i.e., we have "canceled out" all the information we had from the areas by using the average score. This situation corresponds to a "critical value" of the Lagrange multiplier,
V. BAYESIAN THERMODYNAMICS Perhaps it will be striking to the reader (at first) to notice that we have replicated the formalism used to study first-order phase transitions in thermodynamical systems. Imagine the two regions A and B of the game introduced previously, as regions in phase space corresponding, for instance, to liquid and solid, respectively. We can relate the area of each region Σ to the volume in phase space occupied by each of the thermodynamic phases, and in this sense, the quantity
is readily interpreted as the Boltzmann entropy (taking k B =1). Therefore the most probable phase (i.e., the most stable phase in thermodynamical terms) is, in absence of any other information, the one with the largest value of entropy. This is the same situation as in the microcanonical ensemble 7 . When we have information about the expected (or average) score n, analogous to the measured internal energy E of a thermodynamical system (n A and n B are then the internal energies for the liquid and solid phases, respectively), what decides the most probable phase is, according to Eq. 35, the difference in the quantity
which is precisely the Helmholtz free energy (under the identification λ = β = 1/T ),
If we are given a low enough value of energy (close to the energy of the ideal solid) then, despite the fact that the liquid phase has a larger entropy, we are forced to conclude that the system is in one of the (relatively) few solid phase points. Because this reversal of our prediction after knowing n is strikingly unexpected, this situation is described by a large value of the Lagrange multiplier λ which, in the context of thermodynamics, corresponds to a low value of temperature T . The limiting situation when we cannot claim to know the most probable phase happens when ∆F = 0, which is the condition of thermodynamic phase coexistence. The Lagrange multiplier then is λ 0 = ∆S/∆n, or, in thermodynamic notation,
where L is the latent heat associated with the first-order phase transition and ∆S(T 0 ) is the entropy difference at the transition temperature T 0 . All these equivalences are summed up in Table I .
VI. "THERMODYNAMICS" OF A BINARY QUESTION
We have shown that the concepts of latent heat and critical temperature apply to the case of the disc throwing game. However, one may ask, how general are these results? What are the conditions the game must fulfill for these concepts to be applicable?
In the most general terms, consider any question Q which can be answered in the affirmative/negative, and two different states of knowledge: the prior state I 0 and a state I 1 = D∧I 0 which includes a new piece of knowledge (or datum) D.
From Bayes' theorem we have
Dividing both equations and cancelling the common denominator P (D|I 0 ) we have
which can be written in logarithmic form as
Note that
is the only quantity dependent on the datum D, and thus encapsulates the effect this datum has on the balance between Q and ¬Q. To understand the meaning of this quantity, let us define, as in Jaynes 2 (p. 91) the evidence e(Q|D) = ln P (Q|D) − ln P (¬Q|D) in favor or against Q (versus ¬Q). Then Eq. 45 reads,
and therefore E is precisely the change in evidence when incorporating the datum D. Comparing with Eq. 34 written as
we see that, for the disc throwing game, the evidence brought in by the datum n is E(n) = −λ∆n. This corresponds, mutatis mutandi, to E(E) = −L/T for a firstorder phase transition, therefore
Thus in this latter context, temperature T (in units of L) measures the effect, in terms of evidence relevant to which phase the system is, brought in by including the value of energy E in the inference procedure. A large value of the evidence translates into temperatures close to absolute zero, favoring the low entropy phase.
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have shown that, because to every yes/no question we can associate a change in evidence introduced by a new fact, there exist analogous quantities to the free energy difference between phases and the transition temperature, that are closely connected to this change in evidence. When the evidence is strong enough to completely cancel out our initial judgements about the probability of one phase over another and leave us undecided, the "weight" of this evidence is proportional to the transition inverse temperature.
Thus, in this view, the problem of thermodynamic equilibrium between phases is seen as answering the question: is the system in phase A if we know that its average energy is E? in a Bayesian/maximum entropy formalism. The concepts of transition temperature and free energy arise naturally as consequences of this inference framework, and therefore are not intrinsic properties of the systems or the phases.
